There is a second form of extremity which also denies the possibility of translation. It, of course, does not arise from the hermenutics of understanding. It has its root in the hard core analytic philosophy of language. The extremity that I am mentioning is associated with Quine and perhaps we may describe it as Quinean extremity. In the following, I shall briefly explain the impact of Quinean extremity in translation.

     In recent philosophy, Quine is known for his meaning skepticism. He rejects traditional account of meaning as unscientific because it views meaning as if it is something occult. The only conception of meaning that Quine allows is stimulus meaning. It is an account of meaning which is more scientific, exact and progressive than the traditional account. As it stands, for Quine, there is nothing called meaning per se, besides what is implicit in people's dispositions to overt behavior. In thus behavioristic work, as Quine points out, "the question whether two expressions are like or unlike in meaning has no determinate answer, "because, they can be "settled by people's speech dispositions". This is how indeterminacy and reality become inevitable in every use of language. This is the basis of Quine's thesis on the indeterminancy of translation. In the following I shall explain it by first starting what is meant by indeterminacy of meaning.

     To put the problem briefly: Given a particular stimulus there will be different linguistic responses corresponding to it and none will match the other completely in meaning or reference. There will be always an element of indeterminancy as we go along from linguistic response to another. Quine explains this with reference to translation of one language to another.

     Implicit to the idea of indeterminacy of translation is the notion of constructing a manual of translation from some foreign language L 1 into one's own language L 2 . The principle of indeterminacy says that it is possible to construct two different but equally acceptable manuals of translation, i.e, each of which will be compatible with the speech dispositions of the native speakers. Accordingly, a sentence in L may be translated into distinct sentences of L 1 and will have different truth values depending on which manuals to be used. Now since both of them are compatible with the speech dispositions of the native speakers it is not possible to decide which manual of translation is right and which is wrong.

     The theoretical standpoint of Quine makes the two following points clear beyond any doubt. First is the internal ability of the received view of translation, whereas the second speaks of the mythical nature of semantic equivalence. In fact, the latter works as the basis for the former. The idea of semantic equivalence is central to the notion of translation as ordinarily understood. However, the fact expressed by Quine's indeterminacy of translation shows that there can not be any equivalence relationship holding between the original and that which is the translation of it. To note this we have to assume that meaning is determinate. But, meaning, on the other hand, is not determinate and as a result indeterminacy necessarily enters into translation, that is, there can be alternative forms of translation all of which are equally compatible with the original. This indeed, is a predicament which destroys the vary basis of translation.

     In view of this, two kinds of extremities one wonders whether translation can be possible at all. The theory of deconstruction challenges the existence of text and we don't know what is it to translate? Whereas Quine's indeterminacy of translation creates an impasse which also makes translation impossible. But the fact remains that inspite of all these we still translate. We understand others through translation. We recognize a particular translation as a correct translation of the original. But how is this possible? An answer to this will be an answer to the general question: How is understanding possible? It will tell us the way we can overcome the hurdles or impasse of Derrida and Quine.