But the fact that there is meaning shareability, does it not suggest a synonymity relationship holding between the two expressions? Like the notion of equivalence here also I distinguish the two sense of synonymity. In our opinion the two expressions are said to be synonymous on the ground of their linguistic meaning. This is a case of strict synonymity between the two expressions. But this notion of synonymity can no longer be tenable in view of the fact that meaning cannot be defined as linguistic meaning only. As noted earlier since meaning is essentially culture specific it expresses a totality which is composed of linguistic and non-linguistic factors. Understanding the meaning of an expression thus rests on the understanding of the totality it expresses. How is then synonymity to be defined ? the two expressions are synonymous when there is a match between the two sets of totality. There is no determinate meaning or meaning as such. The sole importance lies on how to make a match between the two expressions. This idea of matching, of course, does not speak of any rigid relationship because it is based on approximations. Synonymity, so conceived, is not a rigid concept, because we now consider two expressions as synonymous on the ground that they are compatible.
These findings strongly suggest that semantic equivalence may not be taken to be an expression of strict synonymity or semantic identity, remember, that we are not denying the notion of identity in any absolute sense. To do so, will be to deny semantic equivalence altogether. For semantic equivalence to hold between the two expressions there must be an identity. But as we have argued, that this identity is not a strict identity. Identity is to be understood as compatibility and this in turn implies that semantic equivalence in translation is an expression of compatibility in meaning holding between two terms.
I think there is one more important point to be included in the discussion on meaning and translation. Regarding meaning, I have so far discussed two points. First, there is no determinate meaning and from this it follows that the question like: "What is the meaning of, say, a text?" is not a proper question. The reason is that there may not be any significant answer to it. Second, meaning is understood as use. Where meaning is taken to be a composite term in the sense that it is a composite of both linguistic and non-linguistic elements. Meaning, so, conceived, is thus governed largely by non-linguistic factors and it expresses a totality. In a translation, one requires to understand this totality which is expressed by the meaning of a term. On the basis of his understanding he then looks for a suitable term in the target language that can adequately express the meaning totality. |
The point I am raising up is closely connected with the above perspective on meaning and more specifically understanding. It has been said that understanding the meaning of a term involves understanding the totality it expenses. Understanding here is viewed as a passive and not as an active term. In the context of meaning there is a role of understanding, which has been eloquently pointed out by Philosophers belonging to the tradition of Hermeneutics, such as Heidegser and Gadamer in particular. Their thesis has a crucial significance in the context of translation and meaning. The main contention of the thesis is: first, understanding necessarily involves interpretation and second, there is nothing called understanding per se. Understanding is a historically situated concept. To explain the importance of the thesis in the present context, a translator while he seeks to understand the meaning of a text also at the same time interprets the text. Further, this understanding or interpretation is performed by the translator in the light of his or her historical situation. This is the historicity of understanding, that is, understanding necessarily works with in a tradition. |